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THE REASONABLE PERSON IN TRADEMARK LAW 
LAURA A. HEYMANN* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the often discussed challenges of law school teaching is how to 
integrate the theoretical and the practical,1 a challenge born, in part, from the 
law school’s sometimes uneasy straddling of the worlds of graduate school and 
professional school.  Like medical students, law students must learn industry-
specific terminology for events that they have often experienced in their daily 
lives, terminology that claims to simplify analysis through precision but no 
doubt frequently appears to do the opposite. 
There is complexity in this system, but also power.  The appropriation of 
the facts of the world by the language of the law necessarily results in the 
creation of certain abstractions that tell us how we should conduct our lives.  In 
trademark law, the “reasonably prudent consumer”2 is one such abstraction.  
Also known as the “reasonable consumer” and occasionally simply the 
“reasonable person,”3 this individual is the yardstick against which trademark 
meaning is measured.  And because the meaning of any trademark is ultimately 
determined by the consumer, the typical litigation process—quite naturally—
involves trying to determine what this “reasonably prudent consumer” 
believes.  Sometimes this is accomplished through surveys (although, as 
Barton Beebe has reported,4 not as often as one might expect).  Sometimes this 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.  
Thanks to Elizabeth Millard, David Weder, and the staff of the Saint Louis University Law 
Journal, whose invitation to participate in this issue led me to think more concretely about many 
of the views in this Essay, which will, I hope, redound to my future students’ benefit.  Thanks 
also to Anne Charity and Trotter Hardy for helpful comments. 
 1. Articles containing such discussions abound; a personal favorite is James Boyle, The 
Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1985). 
 2. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 3. 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, ET AL., GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 5.08[3] (2007 ed.) 
(“Courts generally test their impressions of the trademarks at issue against a kind of ‘reasonable 
person,’ a purchaser composite with an assumed level of education, intelligence, awareness, and 
ability to differentiate between trademarks.”). 
 4. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1641–42 (2006). 
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is accomplished through a judge trying to determine what consumers might 
think.  In either case, the goal is to find the meaning of the trademark, the 
answer to the question, and to treat any deviance from that answer as error. 
But the meaning of a trademark is, at heart, an interpretive exercise, and as 
reader-response theory tells us,5 there is no reason to prefer any particular 
interpretation of a text over any other, least of all the author’s.  Of course, 
some meaning must be reached at the end of the day, otherwise litigation 
would never end and legal rights would never be determined.  But to ignore the 
fact that each consumer will engage with a trademark in his or her own way6—
regardless of what trademark law deems legally cognizable—is to ignore the 
realities of the market with which trademark law is supposed to engage. 
Students may be resistant to the introduction of literary theory as a lens 
through which to view trademark law, particularly given the economic story 
that now dominates the field.  But since every trademark law student has, 
presumably, taken a class in tort law during his or her first year of law school, 
we might begin to think about the interpretive consumer by hearkening back to 
tort law’s “reasonable person.”  These two individuals—tort law’s “reasonable 
person” and trademark law’s “reasonably prudent consumer”—are not entirely 
congruent, even though commentators may describe them as similar beings.7  
The reasonable person in tort law is someone who sets a standard of care, who 
models how the law tells us we should act as we go about our lives.  But the 
reasonable person in trademark law is more rule-like than standard-like.8  He 
 
 5. Linda M. Scott, The Bridge from Text to Mind: Adapting Reader-Response Theory to 
Consumer Research,  21 J. CONSUMER RES. 461, 474 (1994). 
. . . [R]esearchers regularly try to match respondents’ interpretations to a single correct 
meaning or answer as articulated in a questionnaire . . . .  Then we treat the variation from 
the preconceived correct meaning as a form of error.  What is missing . . . is the rather 
humbling realization that the “right answer” is simply a case of privileging one reader’s 
experience over another. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 6. Recent commentary has focused on the psychological dimensions of this question.  See, 
e.g., Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary Meaning, 
Genericism, Fame, Confusion, and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013 (2001); Jerre B. Swann, 
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Brand Strength, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 943 (2006). 
 7. See, e.g., 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 8:18 (4th ed. 2007) (“In deciding likelihood of confusion, the courts are in effect 
setting up a standard of consumer care similar to the familiar ‘reasonable person’ standard in 
torts.”). 
 8. Cf., e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 561–62 (1992) (“One can think of the choice between rules and standards as involving the 
extent to which a given aspect of a legal command should be resolved in advance or left to an 
enforcement authority to consider.”).  The description of the “reasonable person” in trademark 
law as rule-like is not a perfect fit; unlike the same character in tort law, he is not being used as a 
yardstick for the appropriateness of the defendant’s actions.  Graeme Austin distinguishes the two 
by noting that the reasonable person in tort law is an “analytical tool,” while the reasonable 
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or she doesn’t embody an aspiration—our response is not to conform our 
activities to his perceptions—but, much like the speed limit on a highway, 
rather establishes the dividing line ex ante between what is legally appropriate 
and what is error. 
Because the reasonable person in trademark law is more like a rule than 
like a standard, there is a tendency—in fact, a need—to treat this person as 
monolithic, with a certain assumed set of characteristics.  A particular 
trademark use cannot be found infringing as to some consumers within the 
same geographical market and not infringing as to others, as this would cause 
chaos in the marketplace.9  And so it probably should not be surprising that this 
“reasonable consumer” tends to look a lot like judges in certain respects.10  In 
part, this is due, as commentators have remarked, to the artificial construct of 
the litigation process, in which courts may be overly focused by counsel on 
evidence of infringement.11  But it is probably due in larger part to the 
difficulty in truly putting oneself in another’s shoes, in thinking about how the 
world might look to someone who doesn’t share one’s own physical and 
cognitive abilities.12 
 
person in trademark law is “a proxy for real people.”  Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the 
Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 832 (2004).  While this is true as a descriptive 
matter, it still seems useful to consider trademark’s “reasonable person” as a yardstick against 
which conduct is measured—only here, the conduct is of parties not directly before the court. 
 9. See, e.g., Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1108 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (Graber, J., concurring) (criticizing attempt to limit relevant customer base to a 
particular ethnic group “[b]ecause a conclusion that Plaintiffs have a protectable [trademark] 
interest would prohibit Defendants from selling groceries under that mark to any residents of San 
Diego County—not just to Mexican-Americans”).  But see Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co., 
272 F. 505, 515–16 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (enjoining use of “aspirin” by defendant when marketing to 
druggists and physicians but not when marketing to consumers): 
Of course, we must not attempt too fine an application of such divisions. . . . For example, 
in the case at bar it is impossible to provide for such rare retailers as may not, and such 
rare customers as may, know that “Aspirin” is a trade-mark.  We can cut only so fine as 
our shears permit, and there will be ragged edges on either side. 
Id. at 514. 
 10. See William E. Gallagher & Ronald C. Goodstein, Inference Versus Speculation in 
Trademark Infringement Litigation: Abandoning the Fiction of the Vulcan Mind Meld, 94 
TRADEMARK REP. 1229, 1230 (2004). 
 11. Id. at 1231. 
 12. This is also true, of course, with respect to many other characteristics, including 
education and income level.  Id. at 1232. 
If in a particular case the fact finder is more educated and affluent than the average 
relevant consumer, his or her subjective impression in a case may be that a purchase 
decision of the kind at issue is routine and inconsequential, whereas the average relevant 
consumer may associate a material level of financial risk with the purchase. 
Id. 
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Tort law has habitually considered how to define its “reasonable person,” 
in particular, which characteristics should be taken into account.  Youth13 and 
physical abilities14 have been deemed legally relevant, while cognitive abilities 
have not.15  (Gender is something of a mixed bag, a result none too surprising 
given the law’s historical focus on the “reasonable man.”16)  By contrast, 
trademark law’s analysis of the “reasonable person” seems to focus primarily 
on the cognitive abilities tort law eschews: how experienced the consumer is in 
the market; how gullible or skeptical the consumer is; how much care the 
consumer takes when selecting items for purchase.17  (Here, too, gender is 
something of a mixed bag.18)  And there is relatively little discussion of the 
characteristics with which tort law concerns itself: visual and other physical 
characteristics that may affect how consumers perceive and engage with 
trademarks.19 
Of course, there is a considerable structural difference between these two 
“reasonable persons”: in tort law, we are adjudicating the actions of one 
defendant, whereas in trademark law, we are considering the (re)actions of 
potentially millions of consumers.  So it is indisputably true, as Graeme 
Dinwoodie has noted, that trademark law must of necessity take certain 
shortcuts to ensure that litigation does not devolve into a morass of evidentiary 
 
 13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (“If the actor is a child, the standard 
of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of 
like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.”). 
 14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C cmt. a (1965). 
So far as physical characteristics are concerned, the hypothetical reasonable man may be 
said to be identical with the actor.  Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness, 
deafness, short stature, or a club foot, or the weaknesses of age or sex, are treated merely 
as part of the “circumstances” under which a reasonable man must act. 
 15. Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P.), is probably the best-known 
case for the proposition that the claimed intelligence of the defendant should not be taken into 
account.  See also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 cmt. n (noting that the 
“reasonable person” standard makes allowances for age and physical disability but not “attention, 
perception, memory, knowledge of other pertinent matters, intelligence, and judgment”); OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1881) (“The standards of the 
law are standards of general application.  The law takes no account of the infinite varieties of 
temperament, intellect, and education which make the internal character of a given act so 
different in different men.”). 
 16. Margo Schlanger, Gender Matters: Teaching a Reasonable Woman Standard in 
Personal Injury Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 769, 769 (2001). 
 17. See, e.g., GILSON, supra note 3, at § 5.08[1][b]. 
 18. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 777 (2004) 
(contending that the “most demeaning conceptions of consumers, and of their intelligence and 
discriminatory powers” tend to be trademark cases involving female consumers). 
 19. Cf. Wesley E. Forte, The Ordinary Purchaser and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act, 52 VA. L. REV. 1467 (1966) (advocating that the FDCA’s false and misleading labeling cases 
should be more sensitive to purchaser traits). 
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issues;20 true, too, that in a field (law) that depends on precedent for efficient 
private ordering, there must be certain general rules that can be derived and 
followed.  But it is worth reminding students how much one’s own viewpoint 
can be mistaken for a general worldview (indeed, we encourage this conflation 
to some extent any time we ask a student in class whether she thinks two marks 
are confusingly similar)21 and how courts’ tendencies to do the same can have 
the effect of creating a market that is more homogeneous than reality suggests. 
Because courts’ and commentators’ discussions of trademark law’s 
“reasonable consumer” seem to take place most often in the context of degree 
of care,22 it is not uncommon to see warnings about courts making judgments 
about consumer confusion by conducting their own comparison “in the peace 
and quiet of judicial chambers,” which is “not the context in which purchasers 
are faced with the marks.”23  The classroom setting, while perhaps not the ideal 
of “peace and quiet,” is equally distant from the marketplace.  But just as 
important as remembering where trademarks are encountered is remembering 
by whom they are encountered: not by some artificially constructed individual, 
but by a consumer who may have vision or hearing difficulties; by a consumer 
whose language doesn’t sound like the unaccented speech of a television news 
anchor; by a consumer who can’t read the label at all. 
I want to be precise about my point here.  The point is not that consumers 
are unsophisticated, gullible, or lack the cognitive ability to understand 
trademarks in the marketplace.24  Indeed, the state of trademark law will be 
immensely improved if courts treat consumers as rational, moral, intelligent 
 
 20. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark Law, in TRADE MARKS 
AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE (J. Ginsburg, et al. eds., Cambridge University 
Press forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 8, on file with author), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=graeme_dinwoodie (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2008); see also Austin, supra note 8, at 904. 
 21. Cf. ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL 132 (Oxford University Press 
2007): 
[L]aw professors direct their students’ attention to the oddly abstract conceptions of 
people and contexts provided by layered readings of legal texts.  The people in these 
landscapes, as well as the landscapes themselves, are configured around points of legal 
argumentation, around strategically structured dialogue . . . .  When students speak this 
language, they operate in a world in which important aspects of social context and identity 
have become invisible. 
 22. See, e.g., Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of Trademark Law, 38 
N.M. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 15–16), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1023930 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 23. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:58. 
 24. Bartow, supra note 18, at 817 (“[C]ourts should consistently embrace something along 
the lines of the ‘reasonably careful purchaser,’ with the approximate purchasing sophistication of 
the judge deciding the issue—a creature far more intelligent and discerning than the consumers 
currently manifest in trademark jurisprudence.”). 
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beings able to make judgments for themselves in the vast majority of cases.25  
Rather, the point is that as we teach students trademark law, we should remind 
them that, as in tort law, the “reasonable person” is a judicial construct—one 
purportedly based on empirical evidence, but a construct nonetheless.26 
There are different ways one might sensitize students to the multiple 
consumers for whom the “reasonable consumer” is a proxy.  One way might be 
to take advantage of Rebecca Tushnet’s tremendous database of audiovisual 
materials, described elsewhere in this issue,27 to assist students in engaging 
with these marks in ways different from their own experience.  Given, as 
Barton Beebe has discovered, that the similarity of the marks is one of the most 
important factors in a judicial finding of confusion,28 it would seem important 
for students (and courts) to consider the aspects of the “reasonably prudent 
consumer” that might cause that consumer to think that two marks are similar 
or dissimilar.29  If, as is often the case, courts look to a consideration of 
“sound, sight, and meaning”30 to determine whether two marks are similar, we 
might want to help students to consider to what degree there is variation in 
how consumers engage with trademarks in these three respects. 
I.  SOUND 
When I first moved to Williamsburg, Virginia, where I now teach, I was 
searching for a gas station late one evening.  Having come upon a gas station 
that had just closed, and not yet knowing the area well, I asked the proprietor 
whether she knew of another station that might still be open.  “Sure,” she 
replied.  “The Crayon gas station is still open, and it’s just two blocks up the 
 
 25. See Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment 
Theory of the Consumer (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  Mark Bartholomew has 
argued that courts required a higher degree of judgment on the part of consumers before 
advertising’s growth in the twentieth century.  Bartholomew, supra note 22 (manuscript at 10–
12). 
 26. Dinwoodie, supra note 20, at 8 (“[O]n the whole, trademark law deals with a rough 
reality. . . .  [The reasonably prudent purchaser] is in large part a legal fiction that implements a 
vision of the degree of consumer protection regulation that Congress and the courts think 
appropriate without rendering commerce inefficient.”). 
 27. Rebecca Tushnet, Sight, Sound, and Meaning: Teaching Intellectual Property with 
Audiovisual Materials, 52 ST. LOUIS L.J. 891, 891 (2008). 
 28. Beebe, supra note 4, at 1600, 1623–26; see also, e.g., Daniel J. Howard et al., The 
Effects of Brand Name Similarity on Brand Source Confusion: Implications for Trademark 
Infringement, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 250, 250–51 (2000). 
 29. Of course, even having considered such aspects, there remains the fact that the concept 
of “similarity” in trademark law is largely undefined.  See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 4, at 1625. 
 30. See, e.g., Henri’s Food Products Co., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 355 (7th Cir. 
1983); see also id. at 354 (“[T]o the extent the determination is predicated on the similarity of the 
marks themselves, this Court is in as good a position as the trial judge to determine likelihood of 
confusion.”). 
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street.”  “The Crayon gas station?” I queried, imaging a service station where 
the gas pumps were decorated in bright primary colors with childish scrawls on 
the sides.  “That’s right,” she replied.  “Just a couple of blocks up the street on 
the right.  You can’t miss it.”  So I returned to my car and, admittedly 
skeptical, drove off in the direction she indicated.  And, sure enough, a couple 
of blocks away, was the Crown gas station.  My New England-bred ears had 
heard “Crayon” when her Southern-bred accent had said “Crown.” 
As courts try to determine whether the “sound” portion of the similarity 
trilogy is satisfied31—and as we encourage students to analyze those 
decisions—it is useful to remember that whether two sounds are indeed similar 
depends to a significant extent on where one lives (or, perhaps, on the language 
one has heard growing up).  While having a linguistics expert testify in an 
infringement case is not uncommon,32 it is unclear from the case law the extent 
to which factors such as regional variations are taken into account.33  As a 
linguistics professor invited to speak to my trademark law class reminded us, 
one doesn’t have to travel too far from home before one encounters difference 
masquerading as similarity and vice versa: the fact that “pen” and “pin” are 
phonetically similar in some parts of the American South;34 the fact that there 
may be mismatches between one’s spoken and written speech patterns.35  It 
may well be worthwhile, assuming a geographically diverse classroom, to 
illustrate this point simply by polling one’s students on their pronunciation of 
particular trademarks. 
When courts engage in this inquiry, however, it’s unclear whether the same 
sensitivity is at work.  Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A, 
Inc.,36 an often studied dilution case, provides one example.  In concluding that 
Toyota’s LEXUS mark for a luxury automobile diluted Mead’s LEXIS mark 
 
 31. One group of marketing scholars has suggested that the comparison of the sound of two 
marks is key.  See Howard et al., supra note 28, at 262 (“[E]ven when brand names are visually 
presented, name sound is the causative element in brand source confusion.  This evidence of 
subvocalization and its effect on confusion indicates the importance of testing brand names not 
only for connotation and appearance but also for how consumers might say the name, which may 
differ from the intended brand name pronunciation.”). 
 32. See generally ROGER SHUY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2002). 
 33. For example, in Bell v. Starbucks U.S. Brands Corp., 389 F. Supp. 2d 766, 777 (S.D. 
Tex. 2005), aff’d, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27961 (5th Cir. Nov. 10, 2006), the court’s conclusion 
that “Star Bock” and “Starbucks” are “remarkably similar in sight and sound” might well have 
been influenced by the court’s location in Galveston, Texas.  Cf. Ralph Blumenthal, Scholars of 
Twang Track All the “Y’Alls” in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2003, at A1. 
 34. David Williford, A Pin Is Not a Pen; Is a Pan? Is Southern Pronunciation Incorrect?, 77 
ENG. J. 25, 25 (1988). 
 35. See, e.g., Anne H. Charity et al., Familiarity with School English in African American 
Children and Its Relation to Early Reading Achievement, 75 CHILD DEV. 1340, 1353 (2004). 
 36. 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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for a computerized legal research service, the district court stated that “in 
everyday spoken English, LEXUS and LEXIS are virtually identical in 
pronunciation.”37  The appellate court, however, was not satisfied with this 
conclusion, preferring to make its own determination: 
[T]he two members of this Court who concur in this opinion use “everyday 
spoken English,” and we would not pronounce LEXUS as if it were spelled 
LEXIS.  Although our colleague takes issue with us on this point, he does not 
contend that if LEXUS and LEXIS are pronounced correctly, they will sound 
the same . . . .  In short, we agree with the testimony of Toyota’s speech expert, 
who testified: 
. . . [P]roperly, the distinction between unstressed I and unstressed U, or 
schwa, is a standard one in English; the distinction is there to be made in 
ordinary, reasonably careful speech.38 
Unsurprisingly, the court equated “ordinary, reasonably careful speech” 
with the speech patterns of the members of the court itself, an equation that 
assumes, as the court later noted, the “careful and precise” diction of a 
television or radio announcer.39  To the extent any consumers do not speak in 
the dulcet tones of a media professional—as many undoubtedly do not—their 
speech is “[extra]ordinary,” “[un]reasonable,” and “care[less]”; in short, 
simply incorrect.40  Thus, despite an ostensible concern with the typical 
consumer’s reading of a mark, courts in such instances impose meaning rather 
than derive it. 
II.  SIGHT 
Many trademarks, of course, are compared visually, particularly when the 
trademark at issue has a graphic element.  Here, too, there is a risk of 
overlooking the possible diversity among the relevant consumer population in 
reacting to the trademark. 
Libman Company v. Vining Industries41 is another example of a case in 
which the court’s preference for its own perspective appears to have driven the 
similarity analysis.  Libman involved two manufacturers of brooms, both 
featuring a contrasting band of color along one vertical segment of the 
 
 37. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev’d, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).  The district court noted that “[t]he most 
tangible evidence of the aural similarity of the two marks was the need of counsel to spell them 
out in order to clarify the record at various points throughout the trial.”  Id. at 1037 n.2. 
 38. Mead Data Central, Inc., 875 F.2d at 1029–30. 
 39. Id. at 1030. 
 40. Cf. Posting of Geoffrey K. Pullum to Language Log, http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/ 
languagelog/archives/000728.html (Apr. 8, 2004, 16:14) (last visited Jan. 15, 2008) (“[T]he fact 
is that whether you pronounce Lexis the same as Lexus is in fact a dialect difference.”). 
 41. 69 F.3d 1360 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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bristles.42  Libman’s broom featured a contrasting band of either red, green, or 
black (depending on the colors of the other bristles); it brought a trademark 
infringement suit against Vining, which manufactured a broom featuring light 
and medium gray bristles.43 
The district court, after a bench trial, found that Vining had infringed 
Libman’s trademark in the contrasting color scheme and awarded Libman 
nearly $1.2 million in addition to injunctive relief.44  On appeal, however, 
Judge Posner, writing for the majority, expressed frustration with the district 
court’s theory of the case.45  The district court’s finding of infringement 
necessarily implicated a finding of similarity, and yet the court had failed to 
account for the fact that the brooms were sold in dissimilar packaging, 
obscuring the bristles.46  And, concluded the court, the unwrapped brooms 
were clearly not confusingly similar when placed side-by-side, as confirmed by 
the appellate court when it viewed the brooms during oral argument and 
“remarked their dissimilar appearance.”47  As a result, Posner noted, based on 
the appearance of the brooms and the advertising for them, “no reasonable 
person would think that there was a substantial danger of confusion,”48 and so 
the finding of infringement had to be reversed. 
Thus, no matter how consumers of various types might have perceived the 
stripe on each of the brooms, the presentation of the brooms themselves in the 
appellate courtroom seems to have been the deciding factor here: Judge Posner 
(and Judge Bauer, the judge joining him in the majority) saw the brooms, 
decided that they were not similar, and then extrapolated from this view to 
declare that “no reasonable person” would think otherwise.49 
 
 42. Id. at 1361. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. 1361–64. 
 46. Libman, 69 F.3d at 1361–62.  The Seventh Circuit went on to articulate a theory in 
which the “undressed state of the broom” would be relevant (that a returning consumer seeking to 
buy another broom would have long ago thrown away the wrapper) but noted that the district 
court had not proffered such a theory.  Id. at 1362. 
 47. Id. at 1362–63. 
 48. Id. at 1363–64.  Indeed, Judge Posner wrote, “We take the district judge to have 
acknowledged this in the passage we quoted earlier from his opinion.”  Id. at 1364. 
 49. See id. at 1364.  The dissenting judge characterized the majority’s approach similarly.  
Id. at 1367, 1368 (Coffey, J., dissenting).  This practice is not, of course, a new one.  See, e.g., 
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Finzer, 128 U.S. 182, 184 (1888) (comparing the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s use of a star logo and concluding that “[t]he two stars . . . are so different in form and 
surroundings that it would not be possible for any person, not afflicted with color-blindness, to 
mistake the one for the other.”).  Indeed, noted the Liggett Court, “[t]he judgment of the eye upon 
the two is more satisfactory than evidence from any other source as to the possibility of parties 
being misled . . . .”  Id.  But see Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) (“It would be little short of arrogation for an appellate court to claim 
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Of course, it is likely true in many cases that the visual similarities or 
differences between two marks will be equally evident to any type of 
consumer, and it is likely true that there is no way to avoid having the court 
engage in its own comparisons of the two trademarks, whether it indicates that 
it is doing so or not.50  But the Libman court doesn’t appear to recognize a 
consumer who may have visual impairments (such as myopia or color 
blindness) that may affect his or her response to a mark.  Rather, to this court, 
the “reasonable person” in trademark law is someone who has the same visual 
perception abilities as the members of the court. 
As such, reasonableness may be—quite literally—in the eye of the 
beholder.  In SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, the Third 
Circuit considered whether the similar appearance of two medications could 
result in consumer confusion as to source, despite the fact that each pill bore 
the logo of its respective manufacturer.51  As between the fifteen percent of the 
patients in a survey submitted to the district court who had trouble reading the 
logos (most of whom, the court noted, were over fifty years of age) and the 
eighty-five percent who apparently did not, the appellate court in this case 
aligned itself with the group with more limited visual acuity: 
The district court, examining the capsules, specifically found that the logos 
were so small that they would be ineffective to prevent confusion as to source 
or passing off.  We have also examined them, and conclude that the district 
court’s finding is not clearly erroneous.  Indeed an opposite conclusion well 
might be, for to our over-fifty eyes the logos are decipherable only with great 
difficulty.52 
Once again the “reasonable person” as judicial construct surfaces.  To 
borrow from Henry Ford,53 a consumer can be as reasonable as she likes, so 
long as she is as reasonable as the court. 
III.  MEANING 
Trademark law as applied to word marks assumes a literate public.  The 
standard economic explanation—that trademark protection reduces consumer 
search costs by maintaining a system in which words and symbols have 
 
that just because every judge can bring to bear his own view of what is similar and what is not, 
the appellate judges’ view must be the right one.”). 
 50. There are other ways in which to compare, for example, two colors.  See Lawrence B. 
Ebert, Trademark Protection in Color: Do It by the Numbers!, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 379, 404–05 
(1994) (proposing use of scientific method of color comparison in trademark infringement cases). 
 51. 625 F.2d 1055, 1057–58 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 52. Id. at 1061. 
 53. Henry Ford was reported to have said, touting the benefits of mass production, that a 
customer could have any color of car he wanted as long as it was black.  See, e.g., THE YALE 
BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 282 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., Yale University Press 2006). 
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consistent source references—necessarily envisions a consumer who sees the 
word PEPSI and can make the cognitive leap to the source of the cola product.  
The process of trademark recognition thus has a symbolic or abstract 
dimension, requiring interpretive skills similar to the abstract skills developed 
through literacy.  This is particularly true given the move of the trademark 
from a brand on the product serving, among other functions, to assist illiterate 
workers in identifying a particular product,54 to a representative symbol 
embodying the product’s actual and intended characteristics. 
But this modern level of engagement with trademarks may not always map 
precisely onto the experiences of a functionally illiterate population.55  
Marketing scholars have suggested that some consumers who are functionally 
illiterate engage with trademarks in a different way from consumers who are 
literate.  For example, functionally illiterate consumers may not treat a word 
mark as a word but rather as a pictorial image, recognizable in subsequent 
encounters only if the mark appears in the same color and font as in the 
previous encounter.56  Any alteration to the brand’s reference may result in the 
functionally illiterate consumer perceiving the brand as attached to an entirely 
new referent, such that “ZEEM cola with lime” indicates a different source 
from “ZEEM cola.”57  This type of reasoning “reflects a primitive ability to 
process information with a one-on-one correspondence to the physical world 
that is available to the senses rather than to the symbolic world that develops 
with literacy.”58  Thus, for the functionally illiterate consumer, trademarks may 
not, in fact, reduce search costs—indeed, they may do just the opposite.59 
 
 54. FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO 
TRADE-MARKS 21 (Columbia University Press 1925). 
 55. The 2003 National Assessment of Adult Literacy indicates that twelve percent of the 
participants studied exhibited “below basic” literacy skills in interpreting documents such as bills 
or prescription labels. See National Center for Education Statistics, Fast Facts, 
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=69 (last visited Dec. 26, 2007).  One should be careful 
in any such consideration to distinguish illiteracy from other educational issues.  See, e.g., Charity 
et al., supra note 35, at 1340–41 (discussing the difference between African American Vernacular 
English and “School English”). 
 56. Madhubalan Viswanathan et al., Decision Making and Coping of Functionally Illiterate 
Consumers and Some Implications for Marketing Management, 69 J. MARKETING 15, 21 (2005). 
 57. See id. at 27. 
 58. Id. at 22 (citation omitted). 
 59. Haeran Jae & Devon DelVecchio, Decision Making by Low-Literacy Consumers in the 
Presence of Point-of-Purchase Information, 38 J. CONSUMER AFF. 342, 351 (2004) (noting need 
of consumers with low literacy for visual descriptions of product qualities); Linda M. Scott, 
Spectacular Vernacular: Literacy and Commercial Culture in the Postmodern Age, 10 INT’L J. 
RES. MARKETING 251, 257 (1993) (“It is not very much of a stretch to say that good consumers 
must first be readers; in the modern era, the drive to market the plethora of new goods has relied 
heavily on textual means of solicitation.”); Viswanathan et al., supra note 56, at 27 (noting that 
functionally illiterate consumers often “cannot readily engage in the abstract and analogical 
thinking that makes cognitive miserliness possible”). 
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It is therefore worth reminding students that there may be instances when it 
is particularly important to consider how a claimed trademark visually 
functions to identify a source.60  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.61 is an 
example of a case in which it is useful to note the range of potential 
beneficiaries of the Court’s decision.  The claimed trademark in that case was a 
gold-green color as applied to dry cleaning press pads.62  Although the opinion 
of the Court made no mention of it, the district court suggested that the reason 
that Qualitex might have sought promotion of the color of the press pads as a 
trademark was that its market consisted primarily of dry cleaning 
establishments, many of which were run by families the members of which 
were “foreign speaking with limited skills in reading or speaking English,”63 
and therefore potentially dependent on visual cues (such as color) to engage in 
source identification.64 
Judges are, of course, literate individuals, and so, as with the personal 
characteristics described earlier, courts may make certain unwarranted 
assumptions about the literacy of the relevant consumer market.65  Because 
 
  One study illustrates the similar effect that culture can have on the interpretation of 
advertising.  In the study, respondents were shown an advertisement for a motion sickness 
remedy in which the box took the place of a buckle on a seat belt.  The American respondents 
understood that the visual metaphor was meant to communicate safety, while some respondents 
from countries other than the United States interpreted the presence of a seat belt as 
communicating anxiety (i.e., that the user of the medication had to be strapped down).  Edward F. 
McQuarrie & David Glen Mick, Visual Rhetoric in Advertising: Text-Interpretive, Experimental, 
and Reader-Response Analysis, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 37, 50–51 (1999) (suggesting that 
consumers lacking relevant cultural backgrounds may have difficulty interpreting advertisements 
that rely on visual tropes). 
 60. See, e.g., Finn v. Cooper’s Inc., 292 F.2d 555, 558 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (noting that a symbol 
is “readily recognized by both literate and illiterate prospective purchasers. . . .  It requires no 
translation into the words of other languages before it can be recognized as a symbol indicating 
source or origin of the goods with which it is used”). 
 61. 514 U.S. 159, 167 (1995). 
 62. Id. at 161. 
 63. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., No. CV 90 1183 HLH (JRX), 1991 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21172, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 13 F.3d 1297 (9th 
Cir. 1994), rev’d, 514 U.S. 159 (1995); see also Stephen J. Newman, Comment, Kill the “Mere 
Color” Rule: Equal Protection for Color under the Lanham Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1595, 1620 
(1994). 
 64. Unfortunately, the district court then went on to conflate a limited ability to read English 
with a lack of care in purchasing decisions.  See Qualitex, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21172, at *13–
14 (“Korean and other foreign speaking purchasers of press pads are unlikely to exercise a 
sufficiently high degree of care to avoid purchasing a Jacobson pad when they are shown a green-
gold pad which they naturally assume to be the Qualitex pad that they have come to recognize.  
The law protects such purchasers.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(assuming purchasers of dictionaries are “generally literate”); Girl Scouts of the U.S. v. Bantam 
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achieving a seat in a law school classroom also requires literacy, students may 
do the same.  But there are ways to remind students that not every consumer is 
so fortunate.  In discussions of Internet-related cases, for example, there is 
bound to be at least one student in the classroom who can describe a relative 
who has used a computer but a handful of times, who might not understand 
how a search engine works or how to extricate oneself from an undesired 
website.  As students analyze the opinions of courts declaring what kinds of 
confusion are justified, and therefore legally redressable, and what kinds of 
confusion are simply user error, knowing someone who will fall on the 
“unreasonable” side of the line makes clearer the practical effect of judicial 
assumptions. 
CONCLUSION 
Recognizing that the construction of the “reasonable consumer” does not 
typically take into account physical characteristics such as visual acuity, 
literacy, and other characteristics that consumers bring to their interpretive 
effort has implications beyond the courtroom or classroom.  It may also affect 
how we think about trademark meaning more broadly.66  Trademark meaning 
may be created by consumers, but the words of the definition are written by 
judges. 
I don’t propose in this Essay to offer a normative proposal as to whether, 
or to what extent, trademark law should look more like tort law in its 
consideration of the “reasonable person.”  Indeed, as noted earlier, I think 
trademark law should expect consumers to exercise a fair amount of discretion 
and judgment, even if this expectation is aspirational.  But I do think it’s 
useful, at the very least, to remember when teaching trademark cases what 
Edward Rogers wrote almost one hundred years ago: Trademark’s “reasonable 
person” is “a real person . . . .  He is the average individual endowed with 
certain faculties and possessed of certain failings.”67 Thus, when students read 
cases in which courts claim to be divining the beliefs of the typical consumer, 
they would do well to consider to what extent this view of what is reasonable is  
shaded by the court’s own experience.68  The necessities of litigation may 
require judicial abstractions, but the realities of the marketplace persist. 
 
Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1112, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)  (“As is the case of 
purchasers of dictionaries . . . purchasers of children’s books are undoubtedly literate . . . .”). 
 66. For example, as Melanie Wallendorf notes, what might otherwise be characterized as 
brand loyalty might more correctly be a coping mechanism to avoid having to memorize a new 
brand name.  Melanie Wallendorf, Literally Literacy, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 505, 508 (2001). 
 67. Edward S. Rogers, The Unwary Purchaser, 8 MICH. L. REV. 613, 621 (1910). 
 68. See Austin, supra note 8, at 922 (“Courts are likely to continue to construct ‘ordinarily 
prudent consumers,’ shaping the characteristics they ascribe to them out of assumptions, general 
observations, truisms, prejudices, and hunches.”).  The marketing literature reflects a similar 
recognition.  See, e.g., A. Fuat Firat & Alladi Venkatesh, Liberatory Postmodernism and the 
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Reenchantment of Consumption, 22 J. CONSUMER RES. 239, 258 (1995) (“[T]he notion of an 
individual consumer is as much a construction of the social system as it is a product of the 
knowledge system that claims to study consumers objectively from a distance, but is, in fact, 
constructing her/him from this imaginary distance.”). 
